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C. ALE mwE CAPRON*
We live in an age of changing law. We have seen familiar and,
what we had come to regard as firmly established, legal concepts
give way to new approaches deemed more in keeping with the
needs of a society. Therefore, it should cause no particular surprise
or concern that this subject has been forced upon our attention.
For many years, neither trustees holding real property nor
their counsel gave any thought to this subject, believing that it was
a settled doctrine that, in the absence of some clear direction to do
so, they were not required, nor were they permitted to set up out
of income a reserve against the depreciation of real property, con-
veyed or devised in trust.
A re-examination of the subject has, however, been forced upon
us by judicial utterances. Doubtless these have been induced by
the uniform practice of deducting depreciation allowances in the
compilation of income taxes, and the more accurate approach of
accountancy to the determination of true income.
The United States Supreme Court has furnished a convenient
definition of depreciation, which we may adopt for the purposes of
this discussion.
Broadly speaking, depreciation is the loss, not restored
by current maintenance, which is due to all the factors
causing the ultimate retirement of the property. These
factors embrace wear and tear, decay, inadequacy and ob-
solescence.1
The conception of depreciation is more readily apprehended if
we consider a manufacturing machine. It is now well recognized
that sooner or later such a machine will be retired. Such retirement
may result from any number of reasons entirely disconnected with
the question as to whether it has been duly maintained and all
needed repairs have been made. A graphic example of this will be
found in the manufacture of textiles. Many textile manufacturers
have retired looms because new looms of a later type substantially
cut labor costs. Doubtless, the old looms, with proper maintenance,
could have continued to operate for many years and would have
been capable of producing excellent goods; but they were rendered
obsolete by advances in the art. "Depreciation accounting seeks
two ends: (1) to provide the retirement cost of assets whose useful
life has expired, and (2) to correctly allocate this cost to the various
accounting periods."2
*Of the firm of Mitchell, Taylor, Capron & Marsh; Member N. Y. Bar.
1 Lindheimer v. Illinois Telephone Company 292 U.S. 151, 167 (1933).
2 Freeman, Public Utilities Depreciation, 32 CoRa L. Q. 4 and 412 (1946).
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Depreciation of a building upon real property may, therefore,
be defined as the loss, not restored by current maintenance, which
is due to all the factors causing the ultimate retirement of the build-
ing, including wear and tear, decay, inadequacy and obsolescence.
In the law of trusts, buildings have never been classified as
wasting assets. However, in a recent law review note, the author
stated: "Although the deterioration of buildings is less apparent
than that of wasting assets, the distinction appears to be one of de-
gree rather than of kind so that the same principles should apply."3
Doubtless, it is accurate to state that deterioration in buildings does
occur; but it does not follow that the rules relating to wasting assets
should be applied to buildings, for differences in degree may be so
great as to require separate treatment and consideration.
The courts have heretofore recognized such a distinction. Said
Professor Austin W. Scott, "Wasting property includes such prop-
erty as leasehold interest; royalties; patent rights; interests in things
the substance of which is consumed such as mines, oil and gas wells,
quarries and timber lands; interests in things which are consumed
in the using or are worn out by use, such as machinery and farm
implements. The common element in the case of all such property
is that its value will necessarily depreciate or be destroyed .... the
courts have not fully recognized the principle as applied to some
types of property such as buildings not used for business purposes." 4
If it be true that the courts have placed real property and wast-
ing assets in different categories, and promulgated different rules
with respect to each, we should not be overly concerned with the
law relating to property recognized as "wasting". However, the
development of the law relating to wasting property illuminates and
helps to clarify the reasons why, over a period of many years, the
court refused to require and would not even permit a trustee to
set up a reserve out of income against the depreciation of real
property.
The important factor here to consider is the wide difference be-
tween the theory as to wasting property, and the practical applica-
tion of that theory.
That theory is clearly set forth in the Restatement of Trusts.
Unless it is otherwise provided by the terms of the
trust, if property held in trust to pay the income to a bene-
ficiary for a designated period and thereafter to pay the
principal to another beneficiary is wasting property, the
trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary who is entitled to
the principal, either
(a) to make provision for amortization, or
(b) to sell such property. s
3 60 HARv L. REv. 952 (1947).
4 ScoT, TRusTs § 239 (1939).
5 RESTATEmENT, TRusTs § 239 (1935).
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This rule is derived from the 1802 decision of the House of
Lords in Howe v. Earl of Dartmouth,6 which held that where per-
sonal property is given generally, or under a residuary bequest, to
a tenant for life with remainder over, the court, in the absence of
language to the contrary, will presume that the testator intended
that the life tenant and the remainderman should enjoy his bounty
equally and not that the property should be swallowed up by the
life tenant's use, leaving little or nothing to the remainderman, and
hence it would not permit the life tenant to enjoy the property in
specie, but would order the sale of so much of the property as was
of a wasting nature, the proceeds to be invested in permanent se-
curities, and the life tenant to be given only the interest therein.
Where this doctrine is applied and the wasting property is sold
immediately, the trustee must invest the proceeds in such securities
as are proper for trust investments, and these securities are there-
after treated as the principal. Where there is delay in the sale, the
income during the delay is added to the proceeds of sale and an ap-
portionment to determine the amount of the permanent principal
is made by ascertaining the amount which, with interest thereon at
the current rate of return on trust investments for the period of
the delay, would equal the amount actually received. Where, how-
ever, the property produces an income, a sale is not necessary, as
the trustee may set aside as a fund for amortization so much of the
income as is necessary to prevent the value of the principal from
depreciating.7
While accepting the theoretical correctness of this rule with
respect to wasting property, the courts have recognized that it is
subject to and must give way to the testator's or settlor's intention,
if that can be ascertained, and that theoretical niceties must never
be permitted to defeat such intention.
An examination of the authorities in which this question has
been considered indicates that the courts entertain grave doubts
as to how far testators or settlors may be deemed to have understood
this theoretical rule and to have established trusts with the under-
standing that it would be applied in their administration.
Since the rule was promulgated, the English as well as some
American courts have been sympathetic to the claims of life bene-
ficiaries that the application of the rule would contradict the true
intention of the testator, and have accepted as evidence of such in-
tention a mere discretionary authority to retain the wasting prop-
erty as an asset of the trust, if the beneficiary were dependent upon
the testator or was one of the chief objects of his bounty.8
6 7 Ves. Jr. 137, 32 Eng. Reprint 56, 25 Eng. Rul. Cas. 29.
7 See Scowt, TRusTs § 241.4, p. 1378 (1939).
8 Matter of James, 146 N.Y. 78 (1895).
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* The attitude of some courts has been to allow even slight in-
dications of a contrary intent to prevent the application of the gen-
eral rule.9 In a 1912 New York decision,10 the court, in view of a
clause in the will which, while not applicable to the property in
question, provided that no part of the income of the securities should
be reserved for the benefit of the remainderman to make good the
wearing away of premiums paid for them, attributed to the testator
an intention that the life tenant should enjoy the whole of the in-
come from leaseholds, without retention of any part for the benefit
of the remainderman.
An intention of the settlor to permit the trustee to retain wast-
ing investments and to pay the whole of the receipts to the life
beneficiary has often been found from the terms of the instrument
as interpreted in the light of all the circumstances. Among such
circumstances are: (a) the specific mention in the instrument of
the property, particularly where it is known to the settlor to be
wasting property12 and especially where it comprises the whole of
the trust property; (b) a direction or permission in the instrument
to retain the property13 although no specific provision is made with
respect to the receipts from the property;' 4 (c) the relatively small
value of the wasting property in comparison with the whole prop-
erty; (d) the relatively small amount of income from the wasting
property in comparison with the income from the whole trust prop-
erty; (e) the purposes of the trust including the relationship be-
tween the settlor and the various beneficiaries; Is (f) the fact that
the settlor in dealing with the property prior to the creation of the
trust has dealt with the receipts as income. 16
9 77 AL . 753, 774 (1932).
10 Frankel v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 152 App. Div. 58, 136 N.Y.
Supp. 703, affd, 209 N.Y. 553, 103 N.E. 1124 (1913), later appeal in 168 App.
Div. 634, 154 N.Y. Supp. 363 (1915).
1I REsTATEMENT, TauSTS § 239 Comment e. (1935).
12 Knox's Estate, 328 Pa. 177, 195 Atl. 28 (1937) (stock in a mining cor-
poration).
13 In re Koffend, 218 Mlinn. 206, 15 N.W. 2d 590 (1944) (direction to retain
the investment in a corporation which had set up a depletion reserve to re-
place capital invested in oil wells); cf. Industrial Trust Co. v. Parks, 57 R. 363,
190 Atl. 32 (1937) (right to hold the investment interpreted as an intention
merely to relieve the trustee from any liability).
14In some cases a direction to give the life tenant the "rents" or "divi-
dends" has been held to indicate an intention that the life tenant should receive
the full income, but in others no significance favorable to the life tenant has
been attached thereto. 77 A.L.R. 753, 775 (1932).
15 Re Hopkins' Estate, 171 Misc. 910, 14 N.Y.S. 2d 71 (1939), noted in 40
COL. L. REv. 544, 547 (1940).
1 6 See Re Hopkins' Estate, 171 Misc. 910, 14 N.Y.S. 2d 71 (1939), where the
court said that substantially all of these six factors were present in that royal-
ties case.
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That the rule of Howe v. Dartmouth is viewed with disfavor
by some courts is indicated by the strictness with which they regard
the limitations of the holding. Its application is restricted to prop-
erty given under only a general or residuary bequest.'7 Further-
more, there is a decided tendency on the part of the courts to treat
mining property as an exception to the rule.' In other cases the
view is taken that in the absence of a direction to sell or to make
provision for amortization the trustee is not under a duty to do
either. 19 Where the trust estate at its creation includes bonds which
sell at a premium at the time of the creation of the trust, the trustee
has no duty to sell the bonds or set aside an amortization fund.20
Professor Scott advocates that even where bonds are purchased at
a premium by the trustee, amortization should not be required.2 '
It may be noted in passing that, when a power of sale is found
to be purely discretionary and that the trustee is, therefore, au-
thorized either to sell or to retain the wasting property, and have
further determined that until the power is exercised all the income
from the wasting property is to be treated as income of the life
beneficiary, the courts have thus converted a merely administrative
power into a power of appointment to the life beneficiary or re-
mainderman over an amount equal to the depreciation value of the
wasting property. Obviously, such a result would hardly have been
achieved had the courts believed that the theoretical rule would ef-
fect the testator's or settlor's actual intention.
The courts which have refused to apply the theoretical rule,
requiring the establishment of a reserve against depreciation out of
the income from wasting property, doubtless indicate the real basis
for the rule, which until recently was believed firmly established,
that a trustee is not required and will not be permitted to establish
out of income from real property a reserve against the depreciation
17 Britt v. Smith, 86 N.C. 305 (1882) (universal legacy); Re Hilliard, 164
Misc. 677, 299 N.Y. Supp. 788 (1937), aff'd, 254 App. Div. 879, 5 N.Y.S. 2d 92
(1938), rehearing denied, 255 App. Div. 781, 7 N.Y.S. 2d 111 (1938) (specific
bequest).
Is 170 AL.R. 133, 142 (1947); ScoTT, TRUSTS § 239.3 (1939).
'9 Dexter v. Dexter, 274 Mass. 273, 174 N.E. 493 (1931). Testatrix devised
her residue in trust to pay the income to her husband for life. This residuary
trust included the right to receive the income from a trust created by anoth-
er, which was payable to the estate of the testatrix during her husband's life;
held: the husband was entitled to the full income without apportionment of a
part to the capital of the residuary trust.
20 Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Williams, 290 Mass. 385, 195 N. 393
(1935).
21 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 239.2, p. 1338 (1939); Ohio General Code section 8509-20
provides that a trustee is not required to, but may, amortize such premiums;
see also N.Y. Pims. Pnop. LAw § 17-d (1942), and Dzx. Rzv. CODE 1935, c. 117,
§ 35 A, as amended by LAws 1941, p. 991.
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of that property. As will be seen from an examination of the authori-
ties upon this subject, the courts have been of the opinion that the
establishment of such reserves would defeat the testator's or set-
tlor's intention.
We shall consider later the question as to whether such changes
have occurred since the rule was established as to lead to the con-
clusion that the basis for the rule is no longer sound.
Before turning to a discussion of the authorities upon the sub-
ject of reserves against depreciation of real property, we would
emphasize that the depreciation of which we speak is entirely sep-
arate and apart from that which may be restored through ordinary
repairs, or the installation of improvement, such as new roofs or
machinery whose usefulness is of limited duration. There is set
forth in a note the rules upon these subjects, as well as those re-
lating to reserves out of current income to provide for anticipated
expenses, to pay for which the trustee may have no other source.22
22 In Restatement of Trusts § 233 (1935), Comments i, j, k and 1, the follow-
ing propositions are stated:
"The cost of putting into tenantable repair premises which were not
in such repair when received by the trustee, whether originally acquired
by the trustee as part of the trust property at the time of the creation of
the trust or subsequently acquired by him, is payable out of principal;
but the cost of thereafter keeping the premises in repair is payable out
of income."
"Although the cost of keeping in tenantable repair property held as
part of the principal is payable out of income, the cost of improvements
when properly incurred by the trustee . . . is payable out of principal.
Similarly special assessments levied against trust property for improve-
ments are payable out of principal."
"If the improvements are permanent in character, the principal is
benefited, the effect being merely to substitute one form of principal for
another. It is therefore fair that the cost for improvements should be
paid for out of principal without amortization. While the beneficiary en-
titled to the income may receive a benefit from the improvements in the
form of increased rentals, this is balanced by the fact that he no longer
receives income from that part of the principal which is expended in
making the improvements."
"If the improvements are not permanent in character but the probable
life of the improvements is limited in duration, although the cost of the
improvements is payable out of principal, the trustee is under a duty to
the beneficiary entitled in remainder to amortize the cost of such im-provements out of income, in accordance with such reasonable plan as he
may adopt .... The result is that if the trust does not terminate before
the end of the probable life of the improvements, the whole cost of the
improvements will be paid out of income. This is fair because the bene-
ficiary entitled to the income gets the full benefit of the improvements
and the remainderman gets no benefit. On the other hand, if the trust
terminates prior to the end of the probable life of the improvements, the
payments from income will cease on the termination of the trust. This is
fair because the beneficiary entitled to the income has not received the
full benefit from the improvements but the remainderman receives a part
of the benefit."
In dealing with these questions, the courts have been prone to approach
them in a practical, if slightly inconsistent manner, rather than on a strictly
theoretical basis. Thus it appears that while various parts of a building, such
as new elevators, new boilers or the like are regarded as temporary improve-
ments, Matter of Adler, 164 Misc. 544, 299 N.Y. Supp. 542 (1937) a whole
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The decision which required reconsideration of this subject
was that of the late Hon. Francis D. McGarey, the Surrogate of
Kings County, New York, in Matter of Kaplan, 3 holding that a
trustee should establish a depreciation reserve out of the rents of
real property held in trust.
The rendering of that decision might lead one of a philosophic
frame of mind to speculation on the question as to how far the desire
for freedom, particularly that of expression, had so infected the
judicial mind as to impinge upon the rule of stare decisis. This is
certainly one of the straws indicating the impatience on the part of
some of our courts with the restraints of that rule and a determina-
tion to substitute their ideas of the requirements of justice under
modem conditions, and not to await the action of the legislature to
correct a rule of law established by earlier decisions. It might be
concluded that such a spirit was here particularly discernible for in
an earlier case, this same judge, while expressing sympathy with
the contention before him that the trustees should establish a re-
serve "for depreciation and obsolescence" stated "The remedy, how-
ever, is within the province of the legislature and not with the
courts."2 4 In Matter of Kaplan, however, he asserted that the earlier
New York decision had not established the rule that no depreciation
allowance should be set aside out of income.
However, we are indebted to the Surrogates for bringing be-
fore us for further inquiry not only what the law is upon the subject,
but what change, if any, should be made in the rule heretofore
established.
In the Kaplan case a trust was established for the benefit of
the testator's two sons. The will directed that the annual income
should be divided between them "after making proper and suitable
allowance for expenses and setting up a reserve or sinking fund to
meet taxes or other contingencies." The testator owned five parcels
of real property improved with apartment houses and also owned
all the stock of two corporations, each of which owned an apartment
building is regarded as a permanent improvement. Smith v. Keteltas, infra
note; Stevens v. Metcher, infra note.
In the prudent management of property, a trustee may, and in some in-
stances probably must, reserve out of current income a sufficient sum to pro-
vide for anticipated expenses, to pay for which the trustee has no other funds;
but such reservation does not change the character of the income withheld.
If it is used to pay items properly chargeable to principal then the life bene-
ficiary is entitled to recoupment when principal becomes available, and if the
funds withheld are not expended they still constitute income which belongs
to the life beneficiary, Shirk v. Walker, 298 Mass. 251, 10 N.E. 2d 192 (1937);
Matter of Parr. 45 Misc. 564, 92 N.Y. Supp. 990 (Surr. Ct. 1904), aff'd without
opinion 113 AD. 921; Matter of Ridge v. Felt, 184 Misc. 11 (1945).
23 195 Misc. 132, 88 N.Y.S. 2d 851 (May 1949).
24 Matter of Horowitz, 192 Misc. 556, 557, 80 N.Y.S. 2d 286 (Surr. Ct. 1944).
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house. The trustees continued the decedent's practice of claiming
an income tax deduction for depreciation of 2 per cent. If allowance
for depreciation were deducted from income it would have amounted
to more than $20,000 annually. The Surrogate held that a reserve
for depreciation should be established. The conclusion so reached
by the Surrogate with respect to the facts then disclosed would not
have been particularly disturbing had he not challenged the view
that earlier decisions had established a general rule that a deprecia-
tion reserve was neither required nor permitted.
It appears that at the time of the decision in this case, the Surro-
gate had not finally reached the conclusion that it was appropriate
to set up what, in accounting circles, would be regarded as a reserve
solely for depreciation. He spoke of the advantages to the bene-
ficiary of the establishment of a reserve fund out of which the cost
of large repairs might be met thus making for stability of income to
the beneficiary and expressly stated (p. 145 of official report):
The disposition of such reserve fund as between income
and principal is expressly reserved forkdetermination until
such time as the trust has terminated, or upon an earlier
application when the facts shall warrant such determi-
nation.
A true reserve for depreciation would, of course, constitute capital.
The fact that it might be convenient to use such reserve for large,
infrequently recurring repairs or temporary improvements would
not change the character of such reserve. If the cost of any such
items were properly allocable to income it would be necessary to
restore the capital out of income subsequently collected and it would
not be material whether the capital had been provided by such
reserve.
However, the subject was discussed by the Surrogate in two
later decisions,2S in the latter of which he said, "A depreciation re-
serve represents principal."
There is a strong preponderance of opinion among the New
York bar that in New York the courts had established the rule of
law, that, in the absence of a contrary direction in the will or other
trust instrument, a trustee is not required to establish a reserve
against the depreciation of a building constituting part of his trust,
and, on the contrary, that it is not appropriate for a trustee to de-
prive the income beneficiary of the moneys which would be re-
quired to establish such a reserve. This view finds support in the
earlier decisions.
In Smith v. Keteltas26 a parcel of real property forming part
of the trust estate had been taken in condemnation proceedings. A
25 Matter of Dahlmann, 95 N.Y.S. 2d 74 (1949); Matter of Kellogg, N.Y.L.J.
1020 (March 22, 1950).
2662 App. Div. 174, 70 N.Y. Supp. 1065 (1901).
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large portion of the award was used by the trustee to construct
buildings on other lots which had formerly been improved but upon
which the buildings were so ancient and dilapidated as to be un-
tenantable and had been ordered to be torn down by the municipal
authorities. The trust term had then lasted nearly sixty years. After
the death of the trustee action was brought against his executrix
to recover the plaintiff's share as one of the remaindermen of the
condemnation award. The court held that the trustee's action in
erecting new buildings was prudent and for the best interests of the
property and he was justified in using the award for this purpose.
The contention that, during the nearly sixty years in question the
trustee should have expended sufficient sums out of income to keep
the property in a tenantable condition was rejected as impracticable
since the condition of the property resulted "not from the necessity
of temporary repairs but from age which had rendered them so
dilapidated and unsafe that their removal became necessary." Of
course, if it had been the duty of the trustee to set up a reserve for
depreciation, it would have been apparent that, during the period of
nearly sixty years, the trustee should have accumulated at least
part of the sum required to erect the new buildings.
The case of Matter of ChapmaZn7 while not dealing directly with
real property, is commonly cited in considering this subject. There
the testator directed that his residuary estate should be held in trust
to pay the income to his widow for life and the remainder to his
children. The executors were directed to continue the testator's in-
vestment in a Great Lakes freight steamer. In a proceeding for the
settlement of the executors' account, five years after the death of
the testator, it appeared that the net earnings of the steam boat had
been computed by deducting from gross receipts every expenditure
made in the running of the steamer, both ordinary and extraor-
dinary, and in making such changes in her rig and equipment as be-
came necessary. In addition, the executors had reserved from the
estate's share of the profits received from the steamer $3,075 and
invested it and paid the income to the widow. The executors claimed
the right to retain this sum, as well as sums out of future earnings,
as a sinking fund to provide against the loss to the corpus of the
estate by depreciation in the values of the steamer. The court held
that the widow was entitled to receive the $3,075 so reserved from
the income. The court said:
There is nothing in the will which indicates to me that
the testator intended that she (the widow) should either
benefit or lose by fluctuations in the value of the estate or
that the remaindermen should be protected at the expense
27 32 Misc. 187, 66 N. Y. Supp. 235, (Surr. Ct. 1900), affd on opinion of the
court below, 59 App. Div. 624, 69 N. Y. Supp. 1131, aff'd without opinion 167
N. Y. 619, 60 N.E. 1108.
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of the widow against such depreciation in the value of this
boat as arises from age or ordinary use.
In Stevens v. MeIcher28 the court held that the construction of
a new building was a permanent improvement and a proper invest-
ment of trust funds, since the trustees were authorized to invest in
real property. In that case the widow, who was the life beneficiary
but not a trustee, removed some old buildings which were not pro-
ducing sufficient rental to pay the taxes and upkeep of the premises,
and entered into a contract for the construction of a new building.
The trustees, after some remonstrance and after having been in-
demnified against loss, joined in the contract. Although the build-
ings cost $120,000 the Referee had found that the construction of
these buildings only increased the value of the property by $90,000
and the trustees were directed to reimburse the widow in such sum
of $90,000. No provision was made for amortization of any part of
this amount out of the income of the premises, thus leading to the
-onclusion that such a building is regarded as a permanent improve-
ment, and that no reserve for depreciation is required or permitted,
in the absence of some direction to the contrary.
In Matter of Danziger29 the residue of the estate was given in
trust for the life of the testator's two children for their support and
education, with direction to pay specific sums out of income upon
the happening of specified events, and out of principal if necessary.
Testator owned one-half of the stock of a corporation which was in-
debted to him and the other stockholders and which owned an apart-
ment house. The corporation was dissolved and the property was
conveyed to the trustee and surviving stockholder in settlement of
the corporation's indebtedness to them. Upon an interim accounting
the guardian for the minor children claimed that a larger amount of
income should have been reported, but the trustee claimed that a
reserve for depreciation should be established. It was held that no
reserve for depreciation should be deducted from the income.
In a substantial number of other cases arising in various Surro-
gate's Courts in New York State, the question has been definitely
presented and decided that the trustees there involved were neither
required nor permitted to establish a depreciation reserve. In those
cases where the trustees had set aside such a reserve, upon demand
of the life beneficiary, they were required to pay such reserve to
the beneficiary.30
28 152 N.Y. 551, 46 N.E. 965 (1897).
2958 N.Y.S. 2d 790 (Surr. Ct. 1945), modified on other grounds, 271 App.
Div. 888, 67 N.Y.S. 2d 130.
30 Matter of Edgar, 157 Misc. 10, 282 N.Y. Supp. 795 (Surr. Ct. 1935); Mat-
ter of Adler, 164 Misc. 544, 299 N.Y. Supp. 542 (Surr. Ct. 1937); Matter of Horo-
witz, supra note 24; Matter of Wadsworth's Will, 81 N.Y.S. 2d 298 (Surr. Ct.
1948); Matter of Hubbell's Will, 90 N.Y.S. 2d 74 (Surr. Ct. 1948); Matter of
Davies, 96 N.Y.S. (2d) 191 (Surr. Ct. 1950); Matter of Ottman's Estate, 95
N.Y.S. (2d) 5 (Surr. Ct. 1949).
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The rule thus established in New York is subject to an excep-
tion with respect to buildings which are used in connection with a
business. Matter of Nesmith-31 involved a trust established by a testa-
tor for the lives of his sons who were named trustees of certain prop-
erty consisting of warehouses, piers and wharves in the City of New
York, which had been used by the testator in the operation of a
warehouse business. The will gave the trustees broad authority to
improve the property as they saw fit and to buy adjoining property
and to raise money on mortgages if they saw fit. The trust property
was leased for a five year term during which the surviving trustee
"deemed it necessary for the purpose of the business" to erect a shed
on one of the piers at a cost of $12,000. In his account he showed an
item of $7,500 paid from income toward that cost. It was held that
the cost of the shed was chargeable to the corpus of the trust, but
that the trustee should retain the increased income which arose
from the additional structure until his advances for its construction
were repaid. In Matter of Jones3 2 the court recognized the propriety
of charging to profits the losses from uncollectible accounts, the
amounts paid for replacement of appliances and horses that had died,
and certain items for repairs.
It has been argued in some cases that in those states which
prohibit accumulations except during minorities or for other lim-
ited periods, reserves for depreciation in other trusts may not be
be directed by a testator or settlor without violating the rule against
accumulations. There are authorities, however, in New York State
which seem to hold to the contrary.33
After the decision in the Kaplan case, supra, some counsel were
of the opinion that safety to the trustee dictated a judicial construc-
tion of the trust instrument. Such a construction was sought in
various cases. 34 Surrogate Collins of the New York County Surro-
31 140 N.Y. 609, 35 N.E. 942 (1894).
32 103 N.Y. 621, 9 N.E. 493 (1886).
3 3 Matter of Jones, supra note 32, Matter of Schummers, 210 App. Div. 296,
206 N.Y. Supp. 113 (1924), aff'd, 243 N.Y. 548, 154 N.E. 600. Matter of Nesmith,
140 N.Y. 609, 35 N.E. 942 (1894). Equitable Trust v. Prentice, 250 N.Y. 1 (1928),
where the court recognized that even for the purposes of the statute against
an unlawful accumulation, the term income must be regarded as flexible and
although all or part of a stock dividend might be deemed income as between
the life tenant and the remaindermen, in the absence of directions to the
contrary, a dividend, if it be added to capital would not result in an unlawful
accumulation. Since it is now current accounting practice in computing net
income to deduct annually reasonable sums to provide for retirement of an
asset, it is not believed that the setting up of such a depreciation reserve would
be regarded by the courts as an unlawful accumulation.
34 Matter of Ottman, 197 Misc. 645 (Surr. Ct. 1949); Matter of Davies, 197
Misc. 827, 96 N.Y.S. 2d 191 (Surr. Ct. 1950), aff'd, 277 App. Div. 1021, 100 N.Y.S.
2d 710; Matter of Ball, 197 Misc. 1047 (Surr. Ct. 1950); In re Bohmert's Will, 102
N.Y.S. 2d 394, 397 (Surr. Ct. 1950), agreeing with decision in Matter of Davies,
supra, this note.
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gate's Court and Surrogate Bucaglia of the Erie County Surrogate's
Court noted the Kaplan case, but arrived at a decision directly to
the contrary. Surrogate Collins' decision in the Davies case3s was
affirmed upon appeal to the Appellate Division of the Supreme
Court.
The subject was also considered in Matter of Hubbell,36 where
real property was held by a corporation. The Appellate Division
of the New York Supreme Court, Second Department, indicated
agreement with the view that depreciation reserves were appropri-
ate, except where construction of the terms of the trust instrument
required that the income undiminished by such a reserve should
be paid to the income beneficiary. However, the Court of Appeals,37
in reversing, refused to rule upon this question, finding it unneces-
sary to do so under the peculiar facts in that case.
The rule so established in New York, with minor exceptions
hereafter noted, has also been accepted elsewhere in the country.
In the District of Columbia, Illinois, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New
Jersey and Washington, it has been held that, in the absence of
some direction in the trust instrument to the contrary, it is the gen-
eral rule that a trustee is not required to and may not properly set
aside a reserve for depreciation of buildings 38
3 5 Matter of Davies, supra note 34.
362 76 App. Div. 134, 138 (1949).
37 302 N.Y. 246, 260 (1951).
38 District of Columbia - In Evans v. Ockerhausen, 69 App. D.C. 285, 100
F 2d 695, (1938), Cert. denied, 306 U.S. 633, the testator devised his real prop-
erty to his wife in trust to use the income for her support for life. There also
was an ambiguous provision with respect to support of the children. The
court there held that the widow was not obligated to establish a depreci-
ation reserve as claimed on behalf of the infant remaindermen. It was further
held that the sums expended to purchase and install electric refrigerators in
an apartment house were correctly charged to the corpus of the trust since
they were fixtures.
Illinois-The United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit in
Laflin v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 69 F. 2d 460 (1934), determined
that the law of Illinois did not authorize or require the setting up of a depreci-
ation reserve on buildings. The buildings there involved were commercial
buildings held by a testamentary trustee.
In another case, United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Third Circuit,
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Saltonstall, 124 F. 2d 110 (1931), the court
recognized as appropriate the setting up of a depreciation reserve with respect
to real property in Chicago where the will authorized the trustees to deter-
mine whether expenses should be charged to capital or income, and whether
receipts should be treated as capital or income.
Massachusetts- In Nelligan v. Long, 320 Mass. 439, 70 N.E. 2d 175, 170
A.L.R. 126 (1946), where the testator directed the trustee to retain shares of a
closely held corporation and buildings if they should prove reasonably profit-
able, it was held that the trustee should not set aside a reserve for depreciation.
Minnesota- In re Lee's Estate, 214 Minn. 448, 9 N.W. 2d 245 (1943), it
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In Freuler v. Helvering,39 a tax case, the United States Su-
preme Court stated, apparently without dissent, that the Court of
Appeals had interpreted the will there in question in accordance
with the general law of trusts, which, it was held, forbade the de-
duction of a depreciation reserve from distributable income, but on
the contrary placed upon the remaindermen the burden of any
shrinkage of capital of that nature.
In California it appears that the courts have directed in some
instances, at least, that reserves should be established. 40
There is one case in Wisconsin which seems to hold that a de-
preciation reserve is appropriate, if there be proof that the value of
a building has depreciated, but not otherwise.4 1
was held that the trustee could not properly set aside a reserve for depreci-
ation of buildings which were a part of the original trust estate.
New Jersey - Fidelity Union Trust Company v. McGraw, 138 N.J. Eq.
415, 48 A. 2d 279 (Ch. 1946) involved trusts for three of the testator's children.
One of the assets of the trust was a theater building. The will expressly em-
powered the trustees to "make such provision for deterioration and ob-
solescence" with respect to real estate included in the corpus "as in their
judgment may deem wise." The trustees sought authority to set up a depreci-
ation reserve with respect to the theater. The court held that this was ap-
propriate. But in Matter of Roth's Estate 139 N.J. Eq. 588, 52 A. 2d 811 (Prerog.
Ct. 1947) where no similar provision was found in the will the court held that
while the creation of a reserve for depreciation is in harmony with modern ac-
counting practice, "generally as between life tenant and remaindermen, the
latter must bear any loss due to depreciation and obsolescence."
Washington -In Chapin v. Collard, 29 Wash. 2d 788, 189 P. 2d 642 (1948),
the testator directed that his residuary estate should be held in trust to pay
the income to his wife for life, thereafter to his niece for life with remainder
to the niece of his wife or her then living children. The assets of the trust in-
cluded two apartment houses, a theater and store building, a super market
store building, wooden garages and a building used as a machine shop. The
court held that:
It is a rule of general application that the beneficiary of a trust en-
titled thereunder to receive the income from such property may not be
required to suffer a deducation from such income for the creation of a
sinking fund to provide for depreciation and obsolescence, unless, in-
deed, the trust instrument or the law of the State makes provision
therefor.
39 291 U.S. 35-43 (1933).4 0 1n one unreported case in California, it was held that a depreciation
reserve should be established with respect to trust assets which the trustee
converted into real estate and other forms of investment subject to depreci-
ation. See Freuler v. Helvering, supra note 39, where the question arose as to
the effectiveness of the decree of the local California court having jurisdiction
over the administration of the trust as against the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue who had assessed a tax to the income beneficiaries, with respect to
income, which under the decree of the local court should have been deducted
from income as a reserve for depreciation. In re Gartenlaub, 185 Cal. 648,
190 Pac. 209, the California Supreme Court held that it was the duty of the
trustee to set aside for depreciation a certain amount of income.
41 Matter of Matthews Estate, 210 Wis. 109, 245 N.W. 122 (1932) leaves
doubt as to whether a depreciation reserve is required or permitted. In that
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Thus it appears that wherever the courts of this country have
considered this question, excepting only the courts of California
and possibly Wisconsin, they have followed the general rule against
the establishment of reserves for depreciation of real property.
However, the question has not been *extensively litigated outside of
New York and in many states no decisions upon the subject are
found.
There is agreement among students of this subject that the gen-
eral rule is as heretofore stated.42 However, there seems to be no
decision of the English courts directly dealing with this question
before the separation of the colonies and it is doubtful whether this
rule may be regarded as part of the common law of those states
where no decision upon the subject has been rendered.
Notwithstanding the weight of authority in support of the rule
against the establishment of a depreciation reserve, it seems that
we would be unwise to stop our consideration there, for criticism
of the rule is not confined to the late Surrogate of Kings County,
New York.
It is not without significance that the Restatement of Trusts,
American Law Institute, contains no statement upon this subject.
This, of course, takes on added significance when we remember
that the reporter in charge of the preparation of this Restatement
was Professor Austin W. Scott, whose current work on trusts in
most instances follows the Restatement. It appears that Professor
Scott entertains grave doubts concerning the correctness of this
rule. He recognizes (1) that it has not been the practice of trustees
to set up such reserves, and (2) that, except as to buildings used
in connection with a business conducted by the trustee, the deci-
sions neither require nor permit the establishment of such reserves.
Since correct accounting theory recognizes that most buildings do
case, the testator bequeathed the use and income of shares in real estate cor-
porations to her brother and two sisters with remainder to four named charities.
One corporation retained a depreciation reserve which amounted to a sub-
stantial sum in 1922 when the building owned by the corporation was sold
and the corporation liquidated its assets. The trustees received by way of a
liquidating dividend its share of the depreciation reserve amounting to $9,111.49.
The trust terminated in 1927 and upon the final accounting the trustee was
directed to pay this sum to the administrator of one of the life tenants. The
court recognized that the setting up of such a depreciation reserve was in ac-
cord with sound accounting practice but then went on to state that the sum
so set aside in such a reserve had not lost its character of income and stated
that there was no showing that the building in fact depreciated in value, and
affirmed the direction of the lower court that the moneys received by the
trustee representing such reserves should be paid to the life beneficiary.
42 2 ScoTT, TRUsTs § 239.4, p. 1342; New York State Legislative Document
(1950) No. 650, p. 20, setting forth the conclusions of Professor Horace .
Whiteside of the Cornell Law School, Research Consultant, who made a study
for the Law Revision Commission; 4 BOGERT, TRusTs Aw TusTEEs, § 803, p. 127.
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deteriorate and become obsolete, and it is becoming more usual in
business to establish such reserves, he is of the opinion that gen-
erally trustees holding rented real property should be permitted,
if not required, to set up reserves.43
Professor Scott's views undoubtedly explain the absence of
any comment upon this subject in the Restatement. Reference to
the views of this eminent scholar is not ill advised for we know that
in at least one other instance his views have prevailed in a field
where the law had not previously been firmly established.44
If not expressly critical, professional accountants have been
careful to point out that theoretically the rule against reserves for
depreciation in trust estates is unsound if true income is all that
should go to a life beneficiary. As stated by Nossaman, "From an
accounting standpoint, depreciation is a cost of operation, like ma-
terial consumed."45 Traver has suggested that when depreciation
allowance is not deductible from receipts before distribution of trust
income, the accountant should, nevertheless, show the depreciation
allowance and the payment of an equivalent amount of principal to
the beneficiary, so that the payment of principal to the life bene-
ficiary would not be disguised.46 Propp has pointed out the fallacies
in some of the arguments in support of the rule against such re-
serves.
47
A law note suggests that more attention should be given to the
testator's own practices in setting aside a fund for depreciation.48
In the face of this questioning and criticism, how far may trus-
tees and their counsel rely upon the application of the rule to all
trusts, particularly in those states where the courts have not spoken?
Should we anticipate the advent of decisions, recognizing the rule,
but refusing to apply it because of evidence outside the trust in-
strument, which might be seized upon as indicating that the testator
or settlor did not intend to relieve the trustee of the duty of setting
aside such a reserve? Would the fact that testator in his income tax
returns claimed a deduction for depreciation, or that the building is
being used for business purposes where physical alteration is heavy,
or where the art is changing rapidly which would require extensive
alteration or abandonment, or other circumstances of like character,
be sufficient to induce a court to require the establishment of such
a reserve?
43 2 Scorr, Thusrs § 239.4.
44 Matter of Stone, 138 Ohio St. 293, 34 NZE. 2d 755 (1941); City Bank
Farmers Trust Co. v. Cannon, 291 N.Y. 125 (1943).
451 NossAw_, TRUST ADMINISTTION AND TAxATiON § 258.
4 6 Traver, How Depreciation Affects Distribution of Income from Property
Held by Trustees, 85 JouRNAL OF AccouNNG 322 (1948).
47 Depreciation of Buildings Held as Testamentary Trusts, 19 N.Y. CERT.
PuB. ACCT. 170 (1949).
48 60 HARv. L. Rv. 952 (1947).
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Before exploring these questions, let us consider the basis for
the rule, so that we may consider the extent to which we may rely
upon it. The reasons advanced by the courts may be briefly stated.
(a) The life beneficiary of a trust should be entitled to substan-
tially the same benefits as a legal life tenant. The mere fact that
one has a legal estate and the other an equitable life interest should
not change the benefits to be derived. Since a legal life tenant may
use real property and collect all the rents and income arising there-
from, subject only to the obligation to keep it in ordinary repair, it
should follow that an equitable life beneficiary should be entitled
to the same benefits and should not be required to permit income
to be accumulated as a reserve against depreciation.49 It would
seem that this is reasonably persuasive.
(b) The remainderman should bear the loss caused by depre-
ciation since he will receive the benefit of any appreciation which
may occur.50 This is an obvious fallacy for the reason that deprecia-
tion is not supposed to cover mere market value depreciation based
on economic conditions not relating to the character of the property.
(c) The difficulty of predicting the life of a building and its
replacement cost would place too heavy a burden upon the trustee,
or would make the result too uncertain. s l
This undoubtedly has much practical merit, but an accountant
has pointed out that the customary "sraightline" method of de-
preciation has become standardized, so as to "devitalize the objec-
tion of uncertainty.' S2 The standardization of depreciation has of
course resulted from regulation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
(d) The life beneficiary is normally the principal objective of
the testator's bounty.5 3 This undobutedly is one of the most valid
and persuasive arguments.
(e) The income remaining after deducting annual installments
of a depreciation reserve would be less than that which was con-
templated by the testator.54 Here again is a valid and persuasive
reason, in cases where the income thrown off from the investment
is small, particularly during periods of depression. It is interesting
4 9 Matter of Roth, 139 N.J. Eq. 588, 52 A 2d 811 (1947); Matter of Edgar,
157 Misc. 10, 282 N.Y. Supp. 795 (Surr. Ct. 1935); Matter of Adler, 164 Misc. 544,
299 N.Y. Supp. 542 (Surr. Ct. 1937).
50 Evans v. Ockerhausen, 69 App. D.C. 285, 100 F 2d 695 (1938), cert. de-
nied, 306 U.S. 633. Matter of Edgar, supra note 49.
51 Matter of Chapman, 32 Misc. 187, 66 N.Y. Supp. 235 (Surr. Ct. 1900);
aff'd, 59 App. Div. 624, 69 N.Y. Supp. 1131, aff'd, 167 N.Y. 619, 60 N.E. 1108.
S2 Propp, Depreciation of Buildings Held as a Testamentary Trust, supra
note 47.
53 Matter of Matthews Estate, supra note 41; Matter of Danziger, supra
note 29; Matter of Wadsworth, supra note 30; Matter of Chapman, supra note
27; Matter of Adler, supra note 22.
54 Matter of Chapman, supra note 27.
[Vol. 12
RESERVES AGAINST DEPRECIATIONS
to note that, although it appears that Professor Scott does not ap-
prove of the present rule, he would permit the trustee to exercise
discretion and omit the deduction of a depreciation reserve when
the amount of income would otherwise be insufficient. ss
We would again emphasize that the question as to whether
such a depreciation reserve should or should not be provided de-
pends finally on the intention of the settlor or testator. Usually
the trust instrument is silent upon the subject and the decision
must rest on rules of construction. In many jurisdictions there is
such a rule of construction that the trustee is neither required nor
authorized to deduct reserves from the income to provide against
depreciation. However, if this rule merely raises a presumption
concerning the intention of the testator or settlor, how far must a
trustee go in examining the surrounding circumstances to learn
whether there are any which might lead to the contrary conclusion
that the testator or settlor intended to give to the income bene-
ficiary only the true income remaining after deducting a reasonable
depreciation reserve?
If there be any such duty on the part of the trustee to make
such an inquiry, then it becomes obvious that in most instances he
will find some one or more circumstances which might be deemed
to indicate such an intent. Reference is made to the almost un-
versal practice of business men to claim deduction for depreciation
in rendering their income tax returns. If a testator has been do-
ing that for years and reporting as income only the net amount re-
maining after such deduction, will the court say his direction to
pay the net income to one for life or some other period indicates
an intention to give such beneficiary more than the testator has
been reporting as net income?
If we add to income tax returns the fact that the testator has
held his real properties in one or more corporations and that these
corporations have actually retained and have not distributed the
reserve, it becomes more difficult to say that the testator did not
intend his properties should continue to be managed after his death
on the same basis.
This discussion should not be regarded as an expression of opin-
ion that a court would be justified in regarding income tax returns
alone as indicating an intent on the part of the testator to vary the
rule against setting up such depreciation reserves. We know that
it is a regular practice for persons owning real property to claim
the permissible deduction in computing the net rents from such
property, but that they do not actually set aside such reserve as
a capital fund.
What conclusions, if any, may be drawn from the foregoing?
5S 2 ScoTT, TausTs § 239.4 p. 1346.
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First, the general rule is that in the absence of a direction to
the contrary, a trustee holding real property is neither required
nor permitted to set aside out of income from the real property a
reserve against the depreciation of that property.
Second, this is a rule of construction founded upon the sound
conclusion that generally, when a testator or settlor directs the
payment of income from or the rents and profits of real property
to a beneficiary for life or a shorter period, he intends to give the
net income undiminshed by the setting aside of a depreciation re-
serve.
Third, this being a rule of construction, it is subject to proof
of a contrary intention based upon extrinsic evidence of facts and
circumstances surrounding the testator or settlor at the time of the
execution of his will or trust instrument.
Fourth, in those states where the general rule has been here-
tofore recognized, we would expect that the courts will find some
means of protecting a trustee who has acted in good faith in not
setting up a reserve; but it may be prudent for the trustees, pend-
ing a declaration of the courts or legislature along the lines sug-
gested below to make inquiry as to the existence of surrounding
facts and circumstances which would indicate a contrary intention
on the part of the testator or settlor.
Fifth, and this is undoubtedly the most important, the courts
or the legislatures of the states should establish a clear and defi-
nite rule, that, in the absence of a clear expression on the face of
the will or trust instrument to the contrary, subject to the excep-
tions noted below, a trustee should not be required or permitted
to set aside out of income a reserve against depreciation of real
property, unless and until a court of competent jurisdiction shall
have found that it was the intention of the testator or settlor that
such a reserve should be so established and shall have so directed.
The exceptions are: (1) buildings used by a testator in the
operation of a business conducted by himself, (2) buildings held
by a testator or settlor through a corporation which has established
and actually set aside as capital a depreciation reserve. In these
two cases the rule of construction should be to the contrary.s6
A clear declaration of this effect is of importance. Trust estates
should not be subjected to the substantial expense which will other-
wise inevitably be cast upon them by the natural desire of trustees
to be protected from the hazards of a decision being rendered,
years after the inception of the trust, that a depreciation allow-
ance should have been established and holding them liable for
S56Matter of Nesmith, 140 N.Y. 609, 35 NE. 942 (1894); Matter of Jones,
103 N.Y. 621, 9 N.E. 493, (1886). As to (2) see Matter of Dodger, 279 N.Y. 646
(1938), and Matter of Hubbell, supra notes 36 and 37.
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failure to have done so. Either a judicial construction or frequent
proceeding for the settlement of accounts will doubtless be sought
unless and until a trustee finds other means of protection from such
an eventuality.
No trustee should be called upon at his peril to determine
whether there are extrinsic facts and circumstances from which a
conclusion, contrary to the general rule of construction, may be
drawn. Nor should income beneficiaries be deprived of the full
income until it is determined that the testator or settlor wished
the income to be diminished by a depreciation reserve.
Doubtless there will be many situations where the establish-
ment of such a reserve would be agreeable to the wishes of the
testator or settlor, and it, therefore, seems preferable that the rule
should relate to the duty and protection of the trustee rather than
being established as a rigid and inflexible rule of construction to
be overcome only by an express statement to the contrary in the
trust instrument.s 7
It should be noted that in order to place trusts in the same in-
come tax situation as are other owners of real property, it is not
essential that reserves against depreciation be deducted from in-
come and added to capital. The federal income tax law has taken
cognizance of the general rule of construction and provided that
the depreciation allowance may be taken by the income benefi-
ciary.s
If legislation be sought in any state to set this subject at rest,
at least to the extent of granting protection to the trustee, consid-
eration should be given to the enactment in Delaware, which seems
57 The New York Court of Appeals adopted such an inflexible rule with
respect to the amortization of premiums on bonds. No amortization was
authorized or permitted with respect to bonds owned by the testator or settlor
but was required where bonds were purchased by a trustee. After the Kaplan
decision, supra, was published, the New York Law Revision Commission, rec-
ognizing the great importance of the question to countless trustees in New
York, undertook a study of the law upon the subject and proposed legislation
to establish rules for the guidance of trustees. (Legislative Document (1950)
No. 65 (0). This, however, was not found acceptable to members of the bar
or the Surrogates' Association since it failed to establish a definite rule for
the protection of trustees, but recognized that extrinsic evidence might be
availed of to determine the intention of the testator or settlor. Later a bill
was framed by a joint committee of various bar associations and introduced in
the legislature. (1950) N.Y. Senate Int. 2394. This embodied the suggestion
above recommended, granting protection to the trustee. The bill was not pas-
sed however, and later representatives of the Executive Committee of the
Surrogates Association expressed the view that the law was sufficiently es-
tablished in New York as to render legislation unnecessary
5S852 STAT. 460 (1938), 26 U.S.C. § 23 (1) and (2), REG. 111, § 29-23 (1)-1.
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to be founded on a forward looking and enlightened point of view.
It was there enacted: 5 9
Unless otherwise provided in the instrument creating a
trust, the trustee thereof shall not be required to, but may
if the trustee deems it desirable, set aside a sinking fund
out of the income of the trust to offset depreciation, ob-
solescence, amortization or other waste of the principal of
the trust.
If it be suggested that it is not appropriate for the legislature
to cast upon a trustee the power to determine what should be in-
come and what principal, for this, in its final analysis, is a power
of appointment, it should be noted that experience shows that testa-
tors and settlors are generally willing and desirous of conferring
upon their trustees the discretionary power to determine all such
questions, if the subject is submitted to them. Discretionary power
of the trustee in this regard has been advocated by Professor Scott.60
The advantages of a statute of this character which would give
great flexibility are quite obvious. All must recognize that no stat-
ute which purports to lay down a fixed and definite rule upon this
subject would effectuate the wishes and intent of all testators and
settlors. There are doubtless many cases where it would be pru-
dent and desirable and in accordance with the best interests of the
settlor's family that such reserve should be established, whereas,
in many other instances, it would place undue hardship upon the
widow and other objects of the testator or settlor's bounty were
the income arising from such a trust to be diminished by the de-
duction of such depreciation reserve. It should not be too difficult
for a trustee to determine when such a reserve would be proper.
However, there seems to be no reason why the trustee's decision
should be made final if there be any beneficiary who desires that
the question should be determined in some manner contrary to the
trustee's ideas. A provision permitting this might be included in a
statute which would in general follow the Delaware statute above
quoted. For example, the statute might provide somewhat as follows:
Unless otherwise provided in the instrument creating a
trust whether heretofore or hereafter executed, and, until
and unless a court having jurisdiction of such trust shall
otherwise determine, the trustee thereof shall not be re-
quired to but may, if the trustee deems it desirable, set
aside out of the income of the trust a sinking fund or re-
serve to off-set the depreciation in any building constitut-
ing part of such trust. The court having jurisdiction of
such trust may determine whether such a reserve or sink-
ing fund should or should not be established and the amount
or proportion of the income which should be set aside for
59 DEL. LAws of 1939, c. 150, § 1, adding § 35-A to the Delaware Revised
Code c. 117.
602 Scowr, Thusrs § 239.4.
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such purpose, but the trustee shall be under no obligation
to seek the advice or instructions of such court.
It is recommended, however, that either the courts or legisla-
tures should put at rest this question which has assumed new pro-
portions following the discussion induced by the decision of the
Surrogate of Kings County, New York, in Matter of Kaplan, supra.

